CARBON SPIDER Embraces Big Game Hunting, Part 1

Throughout 2020, CARBON SPIDER dramatically overhauled their operations. In April 2020, the adversary abruptly shifted from narrow campaigns focused entirely on companies operating point-of-sale (POS) devices to broad, indiscriminate operations that attempted to infect very many victims across all sectors. The goal of these campaigns was to conduct big game hunting (BGH) operations using PINCHY SPIDER’s REvil ransomware. 

CARBON SPIDER deepened their commitment to BGH in August 2020 by using their own ransomware, Darkside. In November 2020, the adversary took another step into the world of BGH by establishing a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) affiliate program for Darkside, allowing other actors to use the ransomware while paying CARBON SPIDER a portion of the ransom received. 

Part One of this two-part blog series details how CrowdStrike Intelligence attributed Darkside to CARBON SPIDER. Part Two will look at CARBON SPIDER’s re-emergence after the Colonial Pipeline attack, which led to the shutdown of Darkside RaaS and the creation of BlackMatter RaaS. 


CARBON SPIDER, commonly referred to as FIN7 and active since 2013, is one of the oldest continuously operating eCrime groups. Between 2015 and 2020, the adversary conducted low-volume campaigns targeting company POS devices, primarily in the hospitality sector. These campaigns featured a variety of malware, including the Sekur (Carbanak) RAT, VB Flash, Bateleur and Harpy (GRIFFON). Using POS malware, including PILLOWMINT, the adversary harvested credit card track data and sold this data on criminal forums such as Joker’s Stash.

April 2020: Target Scope Widens

In April 2020, CARBON SPIDER abruptly shifted from narrow campaigns focused entirely on companies operating POS devices to broad, indiscriminate operations that attempted to infect large numbers of victims across all sectors. The first of these occurred on April 14, 2020, when the adversary likely compromised a legitimate email distribution service to conduct a broad spam campaign targeting thousands of recipients across numerous verticals. 

This campaign used malicious links that led to a ZIP archive hosted on
The ZIP archive contained a Leo VBS, which refers to a family of obfuscated scripts that download and execute a remote payload.

The Leo VBS performs an HTTP GET request to https[:]//alphalanding[.]com/successfully/warranty.eml?uid= and writes a JSS Loader binary to %TEMP%\PaintHelper.exe. JSS Loader, which has both .NET and C++ versions, has multiple capabilities, including the ability to load additional executables, PowerShell (PS) and JavaScript (JS) files.

The observed JSS Loader infection led to the download and execution of a setup VBScript from https[:]//petshopbook[.]com. This script installs a custom Sekur PS stager to %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\WindowsDefender\ClearTemp.ps1 and establishes persistence for this stager with a second VBS that is launched by a scheduled task.

Since this campaign, CARBON SPIDER has maintained an opportunistic target scope, using phishing attachments and links to deliver Harpy, Leo VBS, JSS Loader, Domenus VBS and Domenus JS. Domenus VBS and JS are backdoors (written in VBS and JS, respectively) that enumerate a variety of system information, capture screenshots and browser history, and can download secondary payloads from a command-and-control (C2) server. Secondary payloads can include JS, Portable Executables (PEs), DLLs and PS scripts. 

CrowdStrike Intelligence observed numerous Domenus VBS/JS phishing campaigns that made use of compromised and legitimate services to host Domenus toolchain payloads, including compromised WordPress installations, compromised SharePoint services, compromised web servers and Google Docs.

REvil Ransomware Campaigns

On April 28, 2020, CrowdStrike Intelligence observed a Domenus VBS distribution campaign that used a spear-phishing email containing a Google Docs link. The resulting Google Docs page contained a second link that, when clicked, directed the user to https[:]//chauvinistable[.]com/perfsecure, ultimately redirecting to a compromised SharePoint site. Here, the victim encountered a ZIP file containing a Domenus VBS file that, once opened, downloaded and executed Harpy from https[:]//electroncador[.]com/info

The redirect URL provided from the Google Docs page https[:]//chauvinistable[.]com/perfsecure was hosted on the same IP address (185.163.45[.]249) resolving to a domain used by multiple Cobalt Strike samples sharing key configuration metadata with Cobalt Strike samples used in several REvil incidents. These Cobalt Strike samples were also observed in tandem with the custom PowerShell stager for Sekur. Separate reporting by Symantec further indicated that similar Cobalt Strike samples were used in campaigns delivering REvil. Based on these multiple overlaps, CrowdStrike Intelligence assesses with moderate confidence that CARBON SPIDER was responsible for certain REvil campaigns, likely stemming from JSS Loader or Domenus VBS/JS infections.

Darkside Ransomware Campaigns + RaaS

On July 1, 2020, CARBON SPIDER sent a phishing email with the subject “Notification: Package Status Fail.” The email purports to be from a customer who received an email from the U.S.-based delivery company UPS (Figures 1 and 2). The message body attempts to impersonate a UPS notification, but contains several grammar errors and non-idiomatic terms (e.g., “waybill”).

Figure 1. CARBON SPIDER phishing email

Figure 2. CARBON SPIDER phishing email (continued)

The link “Check” led to a Google Docs page, which contained a link that redirected to a ZIP file. The ZIP file was hosted on a likely compromised SharePoint account and contained Domenus VBS, which downloads Harpy from https[:]//fashionableeder[.]com/info. At one victim, CARBON SPIDER subsequently deployed the aforementioned custom PS Sekur stager and profiled the Active Directory environment using the utility ADFind

In this incident, CARBON SPIDER also used the KillACK PS backdoor, executing the malware using both PowerShell and PowerShell ISE. KillACK sends host information to a C2 server (in this case, againcome[.]com or besaintegration[.]com) and executes provided PS script blocks. Multiple KillACK modules have been observed by CrowdStrike Intelligence, including modules for conducting self-propagation and AMSI hot-patching, as well as for executing Cobalt Strike stagers and enumerating network information.

On Aug. 9, 2020, CARBON SPIDER attempted to run the Darkside ransomware with the filename sleep.exe. This filename may reflect an attempt to masquerade as the legitimate Windows executable with the same name.

Following this incident, CrowdStrike Intelligence identified numerous similar Darkside campaigns featuring distinctive CARBON SPIDER tooling, including Harpy, Domenus VBS/JS, KillACK and Sekur. The adversary also used the commodity Cobalt Strike framework and Plink tunneling tool in many of these campaigns. After achieving initial access, the adversary consistently seeks to harvest valid administrative credentials to enable lateral movement and uses a variety of tools and techniques for this purpose, including CrackMapExec, Kerberoasting, Mimikatz, PowerSploit and SessionGopher. In one incident, the adversary likely exploited the ZeroLogon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472) against a domain controller.

Using valid credentials, CARBON SPIDER moves laterally through victim environments using RDP and occasionally SSH. The adversary typically uses PS to run Cobalt Strike but occasionally writes Cobalt Strike stagers or KillACK backdoors to disk. Occasionally, CARBON SPIDER has deployed the legitimate GoToAssist or TightVNC tools to provide redundant control of hosts.

Similar to many other ransomware operators, CARBON SPIDER not only encrypted victim files using Darkside, but also exfiltrated data for publication on a dedicated leak site (DLS) hosted on Tor. For exfiltration, CARBON SPIDER primarily leveraged the MEGASync client for hosting provider MEGA but also employed GoToAssist. Further, CARBON SPIDER frequently conducted hypervisor jackpotting by encrypting ESXi servers using a version of Darkside specifically designed for ESXi.

On Nov. 10, 2020, CARBON SPIDER announced the establishment of the Darkside RaaS affiliate program. The announcement, posted on two major Russian-language forums, states that the operators of Darkside are looking for Russian-speaking affiliates who understand how to recognize and delete backups. On Nov. 11, 2020, CARBON SPIDER added a new message to their DLS concerning the new affiliate program. This announcement claims “we created the perfect product for ourselves,” indicating that Darkside was originally exclusive to one group and not shared.

CrowdStrike Intelligence assesses that Darkside ransomware campaigns prior to this announcement were likely conducted by CARBON SPIDER, and that CARBON SPIDER was responsible for creating Darkside and introducing the RaaS affiliate program. This assessment carries moderate confidence, based on:

  • Multiple separate Darkside incidents attributable to CARBON SPIDER
  • Low overall volume of Darkside campaigns
  • The Nov. 11, 2020 announcement described above indicating Darkside was initially exclusive to one group
  • The Oct. 10, 2020 press release indicating Darkside is operated by a single group

Subsequent to the creation of the Darkside RaaS program, CrowdStrike Intelligence continued to observe some Darkside campaigns almost certainly conducted by CARBON SPIDER — in addition to other campaigns operated by affiliates — featuring divergent tooling and TTPs. CARBON SPIDER’s campaigns featured the malware discussed above, in addition to heavy use of the Cobalt Strike post-exploitation framework.


CARBON SPIDER’s shift from POS malware to BGH ransomware attacks exemplifies a broader trend in the eCrime landscape. Numerous adversaries that previously relied on banking trojans (e.g., INDRIK SPIDER) or POS compromises (e.g., GRACEFUL SPIDER) have almost entirely reinvented themselves to focus on ransomware, reflecting how lucrative BGH campaigns are. Until the economics of cybercrime fundamentally change, it is unlikely these adversaries will alter their behavior.

Indicators of Compromise

Type Value
Leo VBS 8279ce0eb52a9f5b5ab02322d1bb7cc9cb5b242b7359c3d4d754687069fcb7b8
JSS Loader 98fe1d06e4c67a5a5666dd01d11e7342afc6f1c7b007c2ddbfc13779bcc51317
Sekur stager bbd1c244c0861c0048d5eccecbb6dee1a6f57764c7d0028a7cbfd87c93d3166b
Domenus VBS 00fb044af4c92bd06699aaf1d83c4e6805e96f501f84ad1d2ff0885384aa3ea1
Domenus JS 5b7115ab612dcff8e84b2258082a6e7c71b5d52237a4ae8a6642baeb36c2aa48
KillACK 4f5eefe93ac2fa5f92c6bd245fff1400f6a61aeee07076c92c66d82f94dc45c3

Table 1. Exemplar SHA256 hashes of CARBON SPIDER malware

Explanation of Confidence Rating

  • High Confidence: Judgments are based on high-quality information from multiple sources.  High confidence in the quality and quantity of source information supporting a judgment does not imply that that assessment is an absolute certainty or fact. The judgment still has a marginal probability of being inaccurate.
  • Moderate Confidence: Judgments are based on information that is credibly sourced and plausible, but not of sufficient quantity or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence.  This level of confidence is used to express that judgments carry an increased probability of being incorrect until more information is available or corroborated.
  • Low Confidence: Judgments are made where the credibility of the source is uncertain, the information is too fragmented or poorly corroborated enough to make solid analytic inferences, or the reliability of the source is untested.  Further information is needed for corroboration of the information or to fill known intelligence gaps.

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