On March 4, 2026, Europol announced the technical disruption of Tycoon2FA, a subscription-based phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) platform that enabled cybercriminals to bypass multifactor authentication (MFA) and compromise email accounts. Law enforcement authorities from six countries worked with industry partners to seize 330 domains that formed the platform’s core infrastructure.
Infrastructure takedowns are a challenging and important aspect of adversary disruption and a centerpiece of law enforcement and private sector cooperation in cybersecurity. In situations where direct physical enforcement actions such as arrests are infeasible, disrupting bad actors' operational means can often be the most efficacious and direct way to impose costs on criminals who otherwise act with relative impunity. Nonetheless, law enforcement bodies and their industry partners often go into these technically complicated efforts knowing full well that adversaries are resilient and will likely ultimately overcome or circumvent technical disruptions and reemerge as threats once again.
CrowdStrike applauds Europol and its partners in their disruption efforts against Tycoon2FA. CrowdStrike has often joined law enforcement partners in conducting similar disruption efforts and will continue to do so in the future. As a part of this collaborative spirit, CrowdStrike also stands ready to help provide visibility into the efficacy of disruption operations and help provide "long-tail support" to its customers and the public when criminals attempt to reconstitute their infrastructure in the wake of disruptions.
Since the date of the Tycoon2FA takedown, the CrowdStrike Falcon® Complete Next-Gen MDR team and CrowdStrike Counter Adversary Operations team observed a short-term decrease in the volume of Tycoon2FA campaign activity; however, the volume of cloud compromises has since increased to levels previously observed by Falcon Complete. This resumed campaign volume — and the continuation of previously observed Tycoon2FA tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) — suggests the actors responsible for the PhaaS are likely to remain active in the threat landscape in the short to medium term and warrant continued vigilance by defenders.
Tycoon2FA is a clear example of how today's adversaries operate; they are highly adaptive, technically capable, and persistent in pursuing their objectives. Even as the threat landscape shifts, actors behind platforms like these continue to evolve their TTPs and find ways to maintain pressure on defenders. Staying ahead of that persistence requires continuous visibility across the full attack surface, the ability to correlate signals across domains in real time, and the expertise to act on them decisively. The AI-native CrowdStrike Falcon® platform and the expert defenders in Counter Adversary Operations and Falcon Complete give organizations the speed and depth of coverage needed to detect, disrupt, and respond before adversaries achieve their objectives.
Impact of Disruption
Tycoon2FA began its operations in 2023 and provided a subscription-based toolkit that intercepted live authentication sessions using adversary-in-the-middle (AITM) techniques. In mid-2025, the platform was responsible for 62% of all phishing attempts blocked by Microsoft; Tycoon2FA purportedly generated more than 30 million malicious emails in a single month. Given this prominence, the attempt at disrupting the tool was notable as an effort by law enforcement to disrupt a key component of the PhaaS ecosystem.
The March 4th Tycoon2FA disruption was the result of coordinated action between Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) and law enforcement authorities in Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom, alongside industry partners. The coordinated effort targeted 330 domains comprising the platform’s infrastructure. Additional actions against the individuals related to the PhaaS operation have not yet been reported.
This Tycoon2FA takedown follows law enforcement’s September 2025 targeting of RaccoonO365, which operated as Tycoon2FA’s primary competitor and also enabled threat actors (with minimal technical expertise) to conduct sophisticated phishing campaigns.
Falcon Complete observed numerous Tycoon2FA incidents in 2024, 2025, and 2026, with TTPs that include:
- Using phishing emails to direct victims to Tycoon2FA CAPTCHA pages
- Stealing victims’ session cookies upon CAPTCHA validation
- Extracting victims’ email addresses via a JavaScript (JS) file
- Populating fake Microsoft 365 or Google login pages, which are hosted on a Tycoon2FA domain
- Proxying victims’ credentials to a legitimate Microsoft 365 cloud account via an obfuscated JS file
- Authenticating to the victim’s cloud environment using the stolen cookies and credentials
Tycoon2FA Resurgence
Falcon Complete observed a short-term decrease in the volume of Tycoon2FA campaign activity following the takedown, with daily volumes on March 4 and March 5, 2026, reducing to 25% of pre-disruption levels. However, this volume subsequently returned to pre-disruption levels, with daily levels of cloud compromise active remediations returning to early 2026 levels. Additionally, Tycoon2FA’s TTPs have not changed following the takedown, indicating that the service's operations may persist beyond this disruption.
Falcon Complete has continued to observe a diversity of phishing techniques associated with discrete phishing actors following the date of law enforcement disruption subsequent to March 3, 2026. These include business email compromise (BEC) phishing targeting personal and enterprise users, email thread hijacking, cloud account takeover, and the compromise of SharePoint and cloud environments for the dissemination of malicious URLs that redirect to the Tycoon2FA phish kit. Post-disruption campaigns have leveraged:
- Malicious URLs
- URL shortener services
- Links to legitimate presentation software that include malicious redirects to Tycoon2FA infrastructure
- Threat actor-registered infrastructure impersonating construction entities
- Compromised SharePoint infrastructure from known contacts that retrieves XLSX and PDF files, including malicious redirect URLs to Tycoon2FA infrastructure
In one instance, Falcon Complete observed an active email campaign that attempted to utilize a version of the Tycoon2FA phish kit leveraging Cloudflare r2[.]dev and workers[.]dev infrastructure associated with public reporting on the Salty2FA phish kit. These campaigns were unsuccessful as they retrieved Cloudflare suspected phishing page HTML responses consistent with the claims of takedown. This may possibly indicate continued efforts by industry partners like Cloudflare post-disruption to impact the operation of the Tycoon2FA service.
Following initial cloud compromise Falcon Complete continues to see pre-BEC activity including the creation of suspicious inbox rules and the creation of folders to conceal the transmission of BEC or financial fraud emails from compromised Microsoft Exchange environments.
Between 4 March 2026 and 6 March 2026, Falcon Complete responded to at least 30 suspected Tycoon2FA-enabled phishing incidents comprising at least 12 decoy and credential-capture pages. Tycoon2FA operators typically leverage generative AI to quickly create convincing decoy webpages hosted at a combination of threat actor-controlled domains, which are returned if users fail geofencing profiling measures. Customers of the Tycoon2FA phish kit leverage compromised legitimate domains and abused legitimate hosting services to achieve redirection to Tycoon2FA phishing infrastructure. Some of the domains hosting Tycoon2FA pages have been active since 2025, likely indicating that they have not been subject to the 2026 law enforcement operation. Domains hosting Tycoon2FA pages in March 2026 include:
| Phishing Domain | Parent Domain Control | Parent Domain Registered | Phishing Domain First Observed |
811inboard[.]aeroprimelink[.]za[.]com | Threat actor | August 10, 2025 | March 6, 2026 |
annotation[.]hanoufra[.]ltd | Threat actor | February 9, 2026 | March 4, 2026 |
awssecrets[.]saidiosea[.]dev | Threat actor | January 17, 2026 | March 4, 2026 |
electron[.]c8zoeh[.]com | Threat actor | December 18, 2025 | March 4, 2026 |
hub[.]thadrodrai[.]business | Threat actor | February 9, 2026 | March 5, 2026 |
omegaenergy[.]com[.]np | Threat actor | June 12, 2025 | March 5, 2026 |
pass[.]aeroprimelink[.]za[.]com | Third party; compromised domain | Prior to September 2012 | March 6, 2026 |
pub-9ee1bf400ea645748830bc408aa2b88a[.]r2[.]dev | Cloudflare; shared developer infrastructure Inactive at the time of delivery, indicating successful takedown | N/A | March 5, 2026 |
traelyst[.]dk | Third party; compromised domain | November 20, 2024 | March 6, 2026 |
twig[.]lifeworkinc[.]com | Threat actor | June 20, 2025 | March 6, 2026 |